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THE PERVERSION OF DEMOCRACY IN INDIA:
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS HANDLING OF
DISSENT IN THE PUNJAB
Michael L. Jackson
INTRODUCTION1
Tension between Sikhs and the Hindus in the Punjab
is not new, and the brutal oppression of Sikhs by the In-
dian Government has been ordinary for years. So far as
the Punjab is concerned, India is a nation that purports to
be. a democracy but behaves like a dictatorship The In-
dian government has utilized the legal system to control
and repress Sikh dissent. The anti-terrorist laws passed
there in the last eight years violate basic international
human rights, all of which India claims to uphold.
This paper deals with the perversion of democracy in
India in the limited context of the government's handling
of Sikh dissent in the Punjab. The focus will be on legal
means of repression, rather than an attempt to deal with
the extra-legal means of repression, which are extensive.
3
A very real and complicating factor in any analysis of
India is the fact that it is a nation of nations.4 India is enor-
mous, and it incorporates many cultures and a wealth of
history.' More than 15 million Sikhs live in India, and slight-
ly over 12 million of them live in the Punjab, which is
located in the northwest of India, bordering Pakistan. At
the time of India's independence in 1947, the Punjab was
divided in two. West Punjab became part of Pakistan and
East Punjab became part of India. "After independence,
* the boundaries of several states were redrawn to create
linguistic states on the basis of recommendations made by
the States Reorganization Commission. However, the com-
mission failed to recommend the application of the linguistic
formula to Punjab."6 As a result, the Sikhs pushed for a
Punjabi speaking state. After a prolonged and largely non-
violent protest, in 1966, Punjab was divided into the pre-
sent state of Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh.
Punjab and Haryana shared the City of Chandigarh as a
capital. In the following years there were Sikh demonstra-
tions for Chandigarh to be given over as a capital to Punjab.
Recent political conflict in the Punjab has centered
around demands for greater autonomy, greater respect and
recognition of the Sikh faith,' and in its most extreme form,
demands for a separate Sikh state, called Khalistan. The
Sikh demands are articulated in the Anandpur Sahib resolu-
tion, a document put forth by the Akali Dal (one of the
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Sikh political parties). The resolution, first drawn up in
1973, has been revised throughout the years. As an op-
position party in 1981, the Akali Dal continued to push
for these demands. The demands included:
1. handing Chandigarh over to Punjab;
2. revision of the distribution of Ravi-Beas river
waters;"
3. installation of a broadcasting station at the
Golden Temple, Amristar, for the relay of
spiritual hymns and declaration of Amristar
as a holy city;
4. strengthening the state powers in the federal
Constitution by restricting the Central
government's role to defense, foreign rela-
tions, currency and general communication.'
Another demand, though not in the Anandpur Sahib, was
to amend Article 25 of the Indian Constitution on freedom
of religion, so as to recognize the separate identity of the
Sikhs.' 0 As agitations and demonstrations for the im-
plementation of the Anandpur Sahib resolution increased,
so did the violence which led to the imposition of direct
rule'' by the Central Government in October 1983. The
culmination of the Indian aggression against the Sikhs came
with the attack on the Golden Temple Complex, the Sikh's
most sacred religious area, which began on 1 June 1984.
OPERATION BLUESTAR:
THE ATTACK ON THE GOLDEN TEMPLE
The Akali Dal had been in negotiations with Indira
Gandhi regarding the Anandpur Sahib resolution in May
1984.12 Dharam, the author of The Only Option for the
Sikhs, referred to these negotiations as farcical and emp-
ty, pointing out that the same time the negotiations were
going on, Gandhi was sending all available Indian troops
to the area of the Golden Temple Complex.' 3 Sant Jamail
Singh Bhindranwale, a Sikh leader, and some of his
followers were there, as well as several thousand others
there to celebrate a holy day. On 26 May 1984, Sikh
representatives in meetings at the Golden Temple decided
to launch a non-cooperation movement by withholding the
out-flow of food grains from Punjab beginning 3 June
1984.14 On 27 May, Indira Gandhi gave the go-ahead for
"Operation Blue Star," the attack on the Golden Temple.
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Around the first of June, the press was excluded from
all of Punjab, and the massacre began.' 5 While the Govern-
ment "White Paper," the official report on the Golden Tem-
ple attack, said that the Sikhs started firing and the invasion
didn't take place until 3 June, eyewitnesses claim that the
government forces began heavy shelling on 1 June. On 19
July, the government reported that 493 civilians or terrorists
had been killed in the operation; on 27 October, official
sources raised the estimate to 1,000 dead.16 The authors
of Oppression in Punjab put the number at around 8,000,
with 12,000 more Sikhs being killed in related encounters
shortly thereafter. 7 Later in 1984, in retaliation for the at-
tack on the Golden Temple, Indira Gandhi was
assassinated by her trusted Sikh bodyguards. 8
EARLY LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO SIKH DISSENT
The major thrust of the Indian govemment's attempt
to control the Sikhs has been through the discrete process
of the law. The government has passed and enforced a se-
quence of anti-terrorist laws designed to restrict movement,
speech, and publication.' 9
The National Security Act [hereinafter NSA], passed
in 1980, permitted preventive detention for brief periods.
As ariended in 198420 §3 of the NSA "permits detention
without trial or charge for a maximum of two years in order
to prevent broadly defined activities which are assumed to
be 'prejudicial to the defense or security of India,' or the
Punjab."2 A case arising under the 1980 version of the
NSA would have to go before a review board after seven
weeks; the amended version extends that to six months.
A second amendment to the NSA 22 "permits the continued
detention of persons held under its provisions on fresh
detention orders once the two year maximum period has
expired;" 23 the government can extend detention much as
we renew a library book. The new provisions also "inhibit
the release of detainees by the courts by stipulating that,
in order to release a detainee held under the NSA, courts
must find all detention grounds invalid, rather than any one
of the grounds, as previously.
2 4
Amnesty International has expressed concern that
these statutes could easily be used to detain people who
have done no more than peacefully express themselves.
They also pointed out that Indi&s current preventive deten-
tion legislation bypasses traditional safeguards which ex-
ist to prevent arbitrary and illegal detention. 25 It is clear that
these laws provide a vehicle for the government to silence
their adversaries and chill opposition.
The next substantial, freedom-limiting act passed was
the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act
[hereinafter TAA] of August 1984. This was enacted in
spite of the government's claim that "Operation Blue Star"
had "cured" terrorism. The TAA reversed the presumption
of guilt, so that a defendant was presumed guilty until pro-
ven innocent. Trials were to be held in camera, and
witnesses' identities could be kept secret. At its inception
there were 11 Special Courts in the Punjab. This act per-
mitted Special Courts to be set up anywhere deemed to
be "affected." The courts were for trying people, not only
for offenses which involve the use of violence, but also for
activities such as speech calling for change. Many ordinary
offenses were put into the TAA to bring more conduct
under control of the anti-terrorist laws.
Because these procedures were in violation of Article
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights2 6 which lays down minimum guarantees for a fair
trial, Amnesty International was critical.27 The TAA's man-
date that trials be held in camera was not discretionary.
The putative justification of witness protection made little
sense, but even if valid it was symptomatic of the attitude
that only a minimal and highly prejudicial procedural pro-
cess is owed by the government to people accused of
crimes. Aside from "seriously inhibit[ing] defense lawyers'
cross-examining witnesses to question the authenticity of
their statements," trials held in camera "necessarily did not
inspire the public confidence and lacked the legal safeguards
implicit in an open trial where justice is not only done but
can also be seen to be done."2"
Section 20 of the TAA modified §111 of the 1972
Indian Evidence Act by transferring to the accused the
burden of proving his innocence. This applied to people
arrested under the TAA for "waging war on the State" or
"aiding and abetting the waging of war," and to individuals
who were for any reason tried in Special Courts. The new
Evidence Code section added by the TAA, 111A, 29 pro-
vided that a person found in an area deemed to be "disturb-
ed" by the government be "presumed guilty of the offense
allegedly committed merely if the prosecution could show
that the accused was in a particular area at a particular
time when firearms or explosives were being used against
members of the armed forces or security forces.. ."30
Thus, under this law, someone who happened to be
near an incident could be arrested, detained indefinitely,
tried in camera, and found guilty of having committed such
acts without the prosecution ever having to set forth the
elements of the alleged crime.3' This was worse than guilt
by association; it was guilt by coincidence.
32
The aforementioned provision became a cause for con-
cern because it "could be used to imprison journalists cover-
ing a news event or persons known for their views opposing
the government in power or even innocent bystanders who
happen to be present when a violent incident occurs. .. 3
Indeed, the definition of "terrorist" as all those who disrupt
service or means of communications with a view to caus-
ing fear'to any section of the public or overawing the
government established by law is overbroad. Any street
activity which is a common mode of expression can disrupt
various services, and hence can be called "terrorist."
3 4
The TAA also crucially restricted the right to appeal.
Under ordinary Indian law, an appeal can be made to the
higher court within 90 days of conviction, after which time
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the defendant can appeal to the Supreme Court.3 5 Under
Article 14 of the TAA, a convicted defendant could ap-
peal only to the Supreme Court, and that appeal had to
be made within 30 days. This greatly limited the availabili-
ty of appeal as a remedy for those convicted of "terrorist"
acts, many of which carry a death penalty. It is indeed a
travesty of justice when any person, innocent or guilty, is
put to death by the state after having been legislatively
precluded from contesting the conviction. It was, however,
both a facile way to deal with the opposition and conso-
nant with the general tone of the rest of the TAA.
Amnesty International reported that as of March 1985,
1785 cases had been tried in Punjab Special Courts, with
3264 still pending.3 6 The legislation was drafted so that
even if repealed or expired, charges instituted thereunder
would remain and be tried in conformance with the TAA.
Indeed, this legal structure began to resemble a "second
class system of justice for political offenders."
3 7
1987 LEGISLATION
The Special Courts Act expired in 1987, and with it
expired the Special Courts. But the entity of the Special
Courts as well as most of the draconian elements of that
Act were maintained in a new group of restrictive acts. The
domain of such courts and the extent of police power were
expanded.
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
[hereinafter TDA] of 198738 extends to all of India. It is
extremely broad and highly offensive to international norms
of justice. It replaces the Special Courts with "Designated
Courts." The TDA is written so that nearly any behavior
which is contrary to government's policies is criminal.
The TDA permits a life prison term and confiscation
of all property of anyone accused and convicted of abet-
ting "terrorist" or "disruptionist activity." The definition for,"abet" includes a wide range of activity, and it is clear from
the statute that one needn't be even remotely complicit in
a "terrorist" or "disruptionist" act to have "abetted" in its
commission. 39 The meaning given "disruptive activ{ty" in
the TDA is particularly broad and frightening, as it severe-
ly restricts free speech.
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Therefore, under the Act, merely asking a question in
public about governmental territorial policy can be defined
as illegal. Furthermore, one needn't only "abet" in order to
be penalized for disruptionist activity. Section 4(1) reads:
Whoever commits or conspires or attempts to
commit or abets, advocates, advises, or know-
ingly facilitates the commission of, any disrup-
tive activity or any act preparatory to a
disruptive activity shall be punishable with im-
prisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to im-
prisonment for life and shall also be liable to
fine.
As if speech were not sufficiently criminalized by the
preceding sections, Section 4(3) reads:
... any action taken, whether by act or by
speech or through any other media or in any
other manner whatsoever, which-
(a) advocates, advises, suggest or incites; or
(b) predicts, prophesies or pronounces
or otherwise expresses, in such manner as to
incite, advise, suggest or prompt, the killing or
the destruction of any person bound by oath
under the Constitution to uphold the sovereign-
ty and integrity of India or any public servant
shall be deemed to be a disruptive activity...
[emphasis added].
The implications of §4(3) are far reaching: were a Sikh
even to suggest that with a bloody coup orchestrated by
God as a result of the continuous repression of his people,
he could be convicted for having committed a disruptive
activity. Moreover, a journalist could easily be punished
under this definition as well for reporting the previously
mentioned hypothetical prophesy, or even for merely repor-
ting the existence of political dissent. Essentially, all
criticism or collusion with anyone who has criticized the
government is punishable under these sections. If one hides
or attempts to hide another who has uttered words against
the state or handed out leaflets proselytizing his views, he
too can be imprisoned for life, under §4(4).
The definition of "terrorist act" is also quite broad; the
primary difference between a "terrorist act" and a "disrup-
tionist act" is that the former carries a death penalty. This
section is drawn so that many actions which would nor-
mally fall under the regular penal code can be construed
as "terrorist" and tried under this statute with its various
abrogations of procedure. Section 3(1) reads:
Whoever with intent to overawe the Govern-
ment as by law established or to strike terror
in the people ... or to alienate any section of
the people ... or to adversely affect the har-
mony amongst different sections of the people
does any act or thing by using bombs ... or
other explosive devices ... or firearms ... in
such manner as to cause, or as is likely to
cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or
persons or loss of, or damage to... property
or disruption of any supplies or ser-
vices essential to the life of the com-
munity, or detains any person and threatens
... in order to compel the Government or any
other person do do or abstain from doing
any act, commits a terrorist act. [emphasis
added].
14 IN THE PUBUC INTERESI
If read conservatively, this section would cover acts tradi-
tionally called "terrorist". But it is also easy to conceive of
ways to use this section to convict as "terrorists" people
who have, using a weapon, committed any crime which
involves forcing any person from doing or abstaining from
any act. Any remotely creative prosecutor could satisfy the
"intent to overawe" requirement of the definition in situa-
tions lacking any aspect of physical violence.
Prosecution under §3 is facilitated by those provisions
stipulated in §21 of the TDA. Section 21 provides, for ex-
ample, that if defendanfs fingerprints were found at the
site, or a confession is made by a co-accused that the ac-
cused had committed the offense, "the Designated Court
shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the ac-
cused had committed such offense."4' Thus, in order to
reverse the presumption of innocence against someone ac-
cused of terrorism in India, a mere accusation by one
already accused will suffice. This functions as a supplement
to the aforementioned §111A of the Evidence Code. Plain-
ly, very little is needed to convict, condemn to death or
to life imprisonment someone accused of a crime under
the TDA.
There is also a provision for forfeiture of property.42
Section 8 states that where a person is convicted of any
offence punishable under the TDA, in addition to any im-
prisohiment or fine imposed, the Designated Court may
"declare that any property, movable or immovable or both,
belonging to the accused and specified in the order, shall
stand forfeited to the Government free of all encum-
brances."43 Under §8(2) and (3), the government has the
right to attach all properties belonging to anyone accused
of any crime under the TDA, with such property being
forfeited to the government upon conviction, or even if a
warrant still is outstanding for the accused. If, within six
months from the date of attachment, the defendant appears
or is apprehended, and proves to the satisfaction of the
court that he was unaware of the notice of proclamation
against him, and was not hiding therefrom, he can have
his property returned or the proceeds from its sale in the
event it was sold. The costs incurred in consequence of
the attachment are subtracted from value of the property
before it is returned to him.
The TDA also provides for the imposition of
Designated Courts, much like the Special Courts, in areas
deemed "disturbed."44 Those courts may order summary
disposition for any crime punishable with imprisonment for
a term not exceeding three years. A designated court may,
for any offense:
if it thinks fit, and for reasons to be recorded
by it, proceed with the trial in the absence of
the accused or his pleader and record the
evidence of any witness, subject to the right of
the accused to recall the witness for cross ex-
amination. [§14(5), emphasis added].
The right to counsel is severely limited by this section, if
not destroyed. The fact that a witness can be recalled for
cross examination is of little consolation as §16, in addi-
tion to mandating trial in camera, provides that upon mo-
tion from the prosecutor, witness, or the court's own
motion, the court may "take such measures as it deems
fit for keeping the identity and address of any witness
secret." (§16(2)). In the United States, a fair amount of pro-
tection is provided to informants, but there are also
safeguards to insure that informants are not used to replace
witnesses. But §16 provides that in court witnesses may
be kept secret, so the distinction between informer and
witness is effectively dissolved. The right of confrontation,
which is fundamental to democracy, is simply abrogated.
The TDA further provides that a Designated Court can
rule that "it is in the public interest to order that all or any
of the proceedings pending before such a court shall not
be published in any manner." (§16(3)(d)). This device makes
critical examination of court actions impossible. What is
not published cannot be quoted; what is not quoted can-
not be argued. In the United States only the Federal Inter-
nal Security Court (FISC), which renders decisions on the
permissibility of domestic surveillance, is permitted to
render unpublished decisions. 45 But it is arguable whether
FISC is a court at all, since its structure permits no adver-
sary proceedings. 46 Conversely, the Indian courts are try-
ing many ordinary crimes, and have no justification,
ostensible or actual, for secrecy.
India may have based its constitution in large part on
the American constitution,47 but these procedures couldn't
possibly be extrapolated from the American concept of due
process.48 In law, as in science, it is possible to prove
positives, but it is nearly impossible to prove negatives.
How, absent an unaltered tape recording, can you prove
you didn't say something in a conversation? How, absent
absolute evidence proving you were somewhere else, can
you prove you weren't in a certain place at a certain time?,
How, under most circumstances, can you prove you didn't
do something? These questions highlight why the burden
in all non-totalitarian societies is on the prosecutor: the pro-
secutor claims a citizen acted in a certain way and it is in-
cumbent upon the prosecutor to convince the court and
jury (if there is one) that the claim is fact. Without such
proof, a citizen is innocent.49 The Indian anti-terrorist laws
turn that reasoned and fair procedure topsy-turvy. The
state, with all its power and all its resources, need only ac-
cuse; the accused, whose limited resources are limited fur-
ther because of the confinement following arrest and the
pre-conviction confiscation of his personal property, must
prove a negative.
VICTIMS OF LAW
It isn't difficult to find similarities between India's handl-
ing of dissent and the procedures adopted in recent years
by Israel and South Africa. In all three countries, when the
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government seriously began to debilitate the opposition,
it closed out the press and it created laws so that its most
repressive actions were, in the context of those laws, fully
legal. This is a effective means of dealing with opposition
and minimizing negative reaction abroad.50 Israel, which
the United States refers to as the only democracy in the
Middle East, now tightly regulates when and where news
coverage will be allowed, and it censors what film and video
images are allowed to leave the country for the world to
see. Palestinians in the occupied territories who speak out
against Israeli policy are deported after brief hearings, and
the property of those accused of anti-government activity
and the family of persons so accused can be and often is
summarily destroyed;5' there are similar provisions in South
Africa.52 In both India and South Africa, to speak against
the nation is deemed contrary to public order. The Indian
government's statutes make it possible for one uttering
views against the established authority, or even privately
espousing such views, to be convicted as a disruptionist
and sent to jail for life.
Such brutal repression of free speech, free press, and
free assembly, and suspension of all the usual rights of an
accused, is hardly characteristic of a democracy; rather it
is characteristic of dictatorships and totalitarian regimes.
53
Had exactly the same legislation been reported in Cuba,
Nicaragua, or the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that the United
States government would have maintained the official
silence that has constituted its entire official response to
the Indian anti-terrorist acts. 54 The stories of torture and
systemic abuse of human rights perpetrated by the Indian
government on Sikhs could, mutatis mutandis, be about
Palestinians or Blacks in stories emanating from Israel and
South Africa. The Sikh allegations of the Indians killing their
own people to arouse anti-Sikh sentiment is reminiscent
of the recent Israeli capitalization on the death of Tirza
Porat, a young Israeli woman who was with a group who
went to a Palestinian settlement specifically to provoke
Palestinians (her partner told an ABC News that, "We were
there to show them who owns the land"), and was killed
by her Israeli guard.55 The guard, who was under- official
edict to stay out of such areas, also killed a Palestinian
child. Nonetheless, the Israelis blew up the houses of all
Palestinians accused of being involved in the incident (in-
cluding some who were shown to have saved the lives of
several of the Israelis), destroyed the village's olive groves,
and utilized the woman's death to rally support for the con-
tinued expulsion of the Palestinians.5 6 After a while, the
question of who is provoking whom in India becomes a
tautological exercise. In the end, it doesn't matter. What
matters is that a group of people numbering more than ten
million are being brutally treated by the government of their
country. The very legal system upon which India prides
itself functions as the primary weapon in this battle.
CONCLUSION
A recent New York Times article describes the pre-
sent situation in the Punjab as more explosive than ever.
While in previous years there have been, say the police,
about 500 "extremists" floating around, according to the
police now there are upwards of 2,000. The senior in-
telligence officer interviewed said, "We kept on arresting,
and the number kept on increasing."5 7 In March 1988, ac-
cording to Indian officials, 225 people were killed by "ex-
tremists."5 8
Such "extremism" never exists in a vacuum. Quite often
the government actions have been at least as "extreme"
as the incidents that may have prompted them. Those
demanding the separate state of Khalistan represent the
fringe of Punjab activists. Were India willing to treat all of
its citizens equally and to observe basic international norms
of human rights,59 much of the tension would evaporate
immediately.
In early April 1988 it was reported that eighty to one
hundred Sikhs wanted by the Indian Government were
hiding in the Golden Temple Complex, but in contrast to
June 1984 the police used restraint. An unidentified govern-
ment official is quoted as saying that rather than send in
the military again, they "hope [the new Sikh leaders] can
bring the militants around to lower the threshold of violence
... If it works, there can be talks to solve this problem
within the framework of the Indian Constitution.""
But things are not so simple. There is growing pressure
on Rajiv Gandhi to declare a state of emergency in the Pun-
jab to deal with the increasing agitation and killings of Hindu
civilians. In March, 1988, the Indian Parliament approved
a constitutional amendment that would allow the Govern-
ment to declare an emergency in Punjab to battle the grow-
ing terrorism by Sikh separatists.6 If authority for
suspension of ordinary rights is actually written into the
constitution, an argument of unconstitutionality is foreclos-
ed; but then India's image as the worlds largest democracy
becomes specious.
In the past, some moderate Sikhs who made con-
ciliatory gestures to the Hindu government have been kill-
ed by other Sikhs, who insist on maintaining a more militant
attitude toward the Government. Thus there is dissent
amongst the Sikhs as well. It is abundantly clear that for
any progress to be made, the Indian Government must
begin to observe human rights in dealing with opposition
and political dissent. Criminals should be tried under con-
stitutional statutes. But, if statutes like the TDA, TAA, and
NSA, can be enacted anytime there is palpable dissent,
then the constitution is fatally flawed. The Indian Govern-
ment must make the first move. The Indian government
must, if peace within a democratic structure is what it
desires, listen and go to much greater lengths to accede
to the demands of the Sikhs. The Sikhs must receive a
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measure of autonomy and respect, as least as much as the
Hindus accord members of their own religion. The violence
will continue until a feasible resolution is achieved. With
the death of each Sikh or Hindu, such an accord becomes
more and more remote.63 The hatred runs deep, and will
not subside with overbroad and oppressive law enforce-
ment, which only exacerbates such hatred. Short-term con-
ciliatory gestures will not solve this problem. Again, like
Israel and South Africa, only a substantial political solu-
tion seen as legitimate by both sides will have any signifi-
cant effect.
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specified in subsection (2) [waging war, attempting to wage
war or conspiracy to commit waging war], in
(a) any area declared to be a disturbed area under any enact-
ment, for the time being in force, making provision of the
suppression of disorder and restoration and maintenance
of public order; or
(b) any area in which there has been, over a period of more
than one month, extensive disturbance of the public peace,
and it is shown that such person had been at a place in
such area at a time when firearms or explosives were used
at or from that place to attack or resist the members of
any armed forces or the forces charged with the
maintenance of public order acting in the discharge of their
duties, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary
is shown, that such person had committed such
offence. [emphasis added].
Al memo, supra note 21, at 10.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states: "Every one charged with a criminal offence shall have the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law." This
fundamental principle of law is offended by such statutes.
33 Al memo, supra note 21, at 10.
34 Dharam, supra note 8, at 78.
35 Al memo, supra note 21, at 11.
36 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1986: In-
dia, 219 at 222.
37 Al memo, supra note 21, at 1.
38 Gazette of India Extraordinary, The Terrorist and Disruptive Ac-
tivities (Prevention) Act (1987), No.28 of 1987.
39 Paragraph 2 defines "abet" as:
(i) the communication or association with any person or class of persons
who is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionists;
(ii) the passing on, or publication of, without any lawful
authority, any information likely to assist the terrorists or disrup-
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ment or matter obtained from terrorists or disruptionists;
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(iii) the rendering of any assistance, whether financial or otherwise, to ter-
rorists or disruptionists. [emphasis added]
40 Paragraph 2 of the TDA states that:
(2)"disruptive activity" means any action taken, whether by
act or by speech or through any other media or in any other
manner whatsoever,
(i) which questions, disrupts, or is intended to
disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; or;
(ii) which is intended to bring about or supports
any claim whether directly or indirectly, for the
cession of any part of India or the secession of
any part of India from the Union. [emphasis
added].
41 TDA, supra note 38 at §21.
42 TDA, supra note 38 at §8.
43 Id. §8(1)
44 TDA, supra note 38 at §9.
45 With FISC, however, the statutory presumption is that everything
will be unpublished. The court has the right to order something publish-
ed in certain circumstances. To this date, FISC has elected to publish
one opinion. Gillian Brown The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
1988 (unpublished manuscript).
46 Id.
47 American Influence on the Indian Constitution: Focus on Equal
Protection of the Laws, 17 Colu. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 93 (1986)("...
no other nation has had a polity more receptive to the fundamental rights
enshrined in the American Constitution, nor a judiciary more conscien-
tious in its attempt to guard those rights, than India. Of all the fundamental
rights incorporated into the Indian Constitution, the right to equal pro-
tection of the laws, has been, in many respects, the guarantee of the
greatest importance to the people of the world's largest democracy. Id.
48 Except perhaps in the treatment of people accused of drug crimes,
who can be subject to forfeitures under the "zero tolerance" policy.
49 The United States system is "accusatorial." "An accusatorial pro-
cedure requires the government to bear the burden of establishing the
guilt of the accused, rather than the accused to bear the burden of
establishing his innocence. As the Supreme Court has noted in Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678
(1964), an accusatorial system requires the 'government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load.'", W. R. LaFave, J. H. Israel,
Criminal Procedure: Hornbook Series, at 25 (1985).
50 Indeed, it is a device Hitler used extensively to minimize the ex-
ternal impact of the first major phase of Nazi repression. Until World War
II actually started, the most repressive measures taken against citizens
by the Nazis were dutifully enacted into law by the compliant Reichstag.
51 E. Playfair, Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitiue
Measure in the Israeli Occupied West Bank (Law and the Service of Man,
Occasional Paper #5, 1987, at 12).
52 S. M. Mokone, Anatomy of Apartheid, 98-147 (1980).
53 During the lran/Contra hearings in July 1987, it was reported but
never confirmed for security reasons, that Colonel North and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency CFEMA), had a plan to impose martial
law in the event the United States had a "necessary but unpopular" inva-
sion in Latin America. Reagan Advisors ran 'Secret' Government, Miami
Herald, July 5, 1987. Were we to invade, this could be the method of
dealing with mass disapproval. Even in the United States, those in power
often accept this as necessary in a time of unpopular war. The model
for suppressing dissent easily moves towards military action. Could dis-
sent in the United States over domestic policies elicit a "clear and pre-
sent danger" justification for a similar broadening of police powers?
54 When United States government officials refer to one of the United
States' allies in such situations, language is carefully chosen to minimize
the significance of the situation. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chom-
sky refer to this in the context of "client" and "non-client" states of the
United States. The victims of government atrocity in non-client states are
"worthy" of extensive news reporting and outrage in the United States.
The victims in client states, however, are "unworthy" and receive entirely
different coverage in the United States media. Edward S. Herman
and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media, Pantheon, N.Y. (1988). A recent ex-
ample was when President Reagan, in refusing to compare South Africa
and Nicaragua, attributed the South African problem to "tribal separa-
tions." Regan Hints at Four-Power Talks on South Africa," Reuters Ltd.
(August 13, 1986) Wednesday, P.M. cycle.
55 Army Says Israeli Girl Was Killed by Her Guard, New York Times,
9 April 1988, at 1.
56 Id.
57 India Sees Hope in New Sikh Leaders, New York Times, April
10, 1988 at 3, col 1.
58 Id.
59 See, generally, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted Dec, 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948).
60 India Sees Hope in New Sikh Leaders supra note 57.
61 Gandhi Urged to Order Emergency In Punjab After 89 Die in a
Week, New York Times, April 2, 1988 at 1, col 6.
62 International Commission of Jurists, supra note 6, at 11.
63 The Indian People's Human Rights Commission, was establish-
ed 10 January 1987. The objectives of this Commission are: 1) To
establish the Indian People's Human Rights Tribunal, comprised of retired
Supreme Court and High Court judges of India. The purpose of the tribunal
will be to investigate reports of gross human rights violations committed
by the state; (2) To receive complaints about violations, to investigate
them or cause them to be investigated, with a view to preparing a
preliminary report to be submitted to the Tribunal; (3) To publicize the
work and implementation of the International Covenants and declarations
against state violence, including extrajudicial killings, torture, illegal deten-
tion, and the recognition of political prisoner status for political prisoners.
(Cite).
On January 10, 1987 the Tribunal sent several Judges to Investigate
allegations of police firing into a crowd at Arwal on April 19, 1986, kill-
ing 21 people. The crowd was a demonstration of landless and poor
peasants protesting the expropriation of a small parcel of land on which
nine families had lived. The Tribunal concluded that "The police power
of the State exists for crushing the poor and the exploited and hence works
openly in collusion with the exploiters". Thus institutionalized maltreat-
ment is not limited to the Sikhs. It remains to be seen what effect the
tribunal will have. If recent history is any indication, it may well be outlawed.
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